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Abstract— Delivery of content to mobile devices gains increas-
ing importance in industrial environments to support employees
in the field. An important application are e-mail push services
like the fashionable Blackberry. These systems are facing security
challenges regarding data transport to, and storage of the data
on the end user equipment. The emerging Trusted Computing
technology offers new answers to these open questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The share of workers occupied with ‘nomadic’ tasks in
mobile contexts is constantly growing over the last years.
These workers depend on infrastructures for easy and swift
access to essential data. This has contributed to the success
of data push services like RIM’s Blackberry, which conquers
the market quickly. E-Mail push is one basic value proposition
aiming at high availability and ease of use. Push services are
characterised by the ability to notify end users of new content.
For an e-mail service the end user device is activated by the
central mail server, receives the new mail, and alerts the user.
Some providers have extended their service range to enable
access to company databases and implement loosely coupled
work-flows incorporating nomadic workers.
Due to the high potential value of the exchanged data these
systems are threatened by, maybe even professional attackers,
raising the requirement to protect the distribution of pushed
data. The technical problems entailed by this requirement are
in the focus of the present contribution. Pertinent security
concerns can be grouped in two main areas. First, data has
to be protected on the way to the device. During the transport
the main concern is to maintain confidentiality viz prevent
eavesdropping. Second, after the data is delivered to the device
the data has to be protected against unauthorised access. The
latter problem is of practical importance in use cases like the
mentioned e-mail push, but also for ordinary e-mail, SMS
delivery, and other data synchronisation processes between a
central data base and a mobile device. Current approaches
to this challenge are predominantly using software tokens,
e.g., PKCS#7 as containers of credentials used to secure
message transport and storage. Software solutions however
suffer from the drawback that an attacker can extract the keys
from memory during the encryption or decryption of a data
block. Smart cards are one approach to this problem but in the
mobile domain no standard has managed to become prevalent.
The security problems of push services are adjacent to
general protection of content in transmission. Protection of
mobile content is a major use case for Trusted Computing [1].
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It therefore stands to reason to use Trusted Computing (TC)
for a novel approach to push service security. We present
two technical scenarios relying on Trusted Computing to
mitigate the sketched security problems. The following section
introduces basics of content push architectures and discusses
their security issues. Section III lays out the basic facts about
TC needed in the following, and Section IV exhibits our
concepts proper. Section V contains conclusions.
II. CONTENT PUSH ARCHITECTURES
The idea behind a content push architecture is to inform a
user if new data is available without necessitating any user
interaction. The basic method for this has been formulated for
instance in the standards of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA,
see [2]).
Notifying a user can be done using either a centralised
or decentralised approach. Figure 1 illustrates the former. In
the centre of this architecture a Network Operation Center
(NOC) performs all activities regarding the communication to
the mobile devices. The data destined for the mobile devices
are stored in sources like mail servers. These sources excite
the push server and deliver the data. Due to this activation
the push server either requests a communication line to the
mobile device managed by the NOC or delivers the data to
the NOC which in turn stores the data until they are handed
to the mobile device. From a company’s view the management
costs are low in this scenario, as there is no additional effort
needed to maintain, e.g., a special firewall configuration.
Figure 2 shows the decentralised counterpart where no
central server is in charge to communicate to the attached
devices. This scheme differs from the one above in that
 
1525-3511/07/$25.00 ©2007 IEEE 
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the WCNC 2007 proceedings. 
 
2911
Mail-Server
Database Server
Content Server
Internet
Push Server
Network Operator
DMZ
Firewall
Intranet
Gateway
Server
Fig. 2. A decentralised architecture
the communication between push server and mobile device
is direct. For a company using this scheme it is necessary
to enable device access over, e.g., the Internet to servers
behind a company firewall. This requires a specially hardened
network topology like a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) housing
the push server or a proxy server to mediate access to the push
infrastructure inside the corporate network.
The centralised scheme is the prevalent architecture used
by the market leader. Nevertheless, it raises some security
concerns in particular with regard to availability and privacy.
Denial of service attacks aiming at the service level of a
NOC lead in the worst case to a complete service breakdown.
High value and visibility of the target make corresponding
attacks very likely. If we take a malicious service provider into
consideration privacy concerns are added to the general ones
regarding transport security. Potentially the NOC can access
every message which is sent to a mobile device, allowing for
information leakage. First and foremost the message content
could be extracted and disclosed. Moreover, analysis of the
collaboration between active users becomes possible. Both
attacks have to be treated in the protocol design to enable
end-to-end security and to conceal all sensitive information. It
should be noted that end-to-end security is to be established
between the push server and the mobile device in contrast to
well known protocols like PGP or S/MIME.
Beside the requirements on the infrastructure the mobile de-
vice itself must also be examined from a security perspective.
All data transferred to the end user device is stored there. An
attacker can gain access to this data by theft or penetration
attacks (e.g. by Bluetooth), or social engineering. Most of
these security considerations are not considered in existing
standards. For instance the document [2, Section 11] regards
mainly authentication issues.
III. TRUSTED COMPUTING ESSENTIALS
Trusted computing uses a hardware anchor as a root of
trust and is now entering the mobile domain with the aim
to provide a standardised security infrastructure. Trust in the
context of TC means (as defined by the TCG) that an entity
always behaves in the expected manner for the intended
purpose. The trust anchor, called Trusted Platform Module
(TPM), offers various functions from two main areas. First
the ability of the TPM to create, store, and use asymmetric
key pairs and secondly, the ability to provide an assertion
to the exterior about the system state and the integrity of
the system. Each TPM is bound to a certain environment
and together they form a trusted platform (TP) from which
the TPM cannot be removed. Through the TPM the TP has
access to a cryptographic engine and a protected storage. Each
physical instantiation of a TPM has a unique identity embodied
in an Endorsement Key (EK) which is created at manufacture
time. This key is used as a base for secure transactions as the
Endorsement Key Credential (EKC) asserts that the holder of
the private portion of the EK is a TPM conforming to the TCG
specification. The EKC is issued as well at production time and
the private part of the key pair never leaves the TPM. There
are other credentials stating the conformance of the TPM and
the platform, which are not of importance here. Before a TPM
can be used a take ownership procedure must be performed in
which the usage of the TPM is bound to a certain user. The
following technical details are taken from [3].
For the TPM to issue an assertion about the system state,
two protocols are available for the process called attestation.
As the uniqueness of every TPM leads to privacy concerns,
they provide pseudonymity, respectively, anonymity. Both ex-
isting attestation protocols rest on Attestation Identity Keys
(AIKs) which are placeholders for the EK. An AIK is a
1024 bit RSA key the private portion of which is sealed
inside the TPM. The simpler protocol of Remote Attestation
(RA) offers pseudonymity by introducing a trusted third party,
the privacy CA (PCA, see [4]), which issues a credential
stating that the respective AIK is generated by a sound TPM
within a valid platform. This credential together with the AIK
can therefore be used as an identity for this platform. The
system state is measured by a reporting process with the TPM
as its central reporting authority receiving the measurement
values and calculating a unique representation of the state
using hash values. For this, the TPM has several Platform
Configuration registers (PCR). Beginning with the system boot
each component reports a measurement value, e.g., a hash
value over the BIOS, to the TPM and stores it in a log
file. During RA, the communication partner which wants to
establish trust in the TP and acts as verifier receives this log file
and the corresponding PCR value. The verifier can then decide
if the device is in a configuration which is trustworthy from
his perspective. Apart from RA, the TCG has defined Direct
Anonymous Attestation. This involved protocol is based on
a zero knowledge proof but due to certain constraints of the
hardware it is not implemented in current TPMs.
Beside the attestation methods TC offers a concept to bind
blobs of data to a single instantiation and state of a TPM,
which is essential for the concept presented below. The
operation takes the data blob that is the result of a command
and decrypts it for export to the user. The caller must authorise
the use of the key that will decrypt the incoming blob. In
consequence this data blob is only accessible if the platform
is in the namely state which is associated with the respective
PCR value.
A mobile version of the TPM is currently being defined
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by the TCG’s Mobile Phone Working Group [5]. This so-
called Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) differs significantly
from the TPM of the PC world and is in fact more powerful in
some respects. In particular, it contains a built-in verifier for
attestation requests, substituting partly for an external PCA.
Both TPM and MTM are a solid basis for the push service
security concept we now present.
IV. CONCEPTS FOR TRUSTED CONTENT PUSH
Based on blob binding as presented before we develop a
basic scenario to protect the data which is exchanged between
a data source and a mobile device. Figure 3 exemplifies the
simple protocol between the actors of a potential uses case.
The data source (e.g., a mail server) receives new data which
are to be synchronised with the mobile device. Step 1 signals
the synchronisation server which controls the synchronisation
process. This can be implemented as a push (data source
activated) or as a pull scheme (the synchronisation server pe-
riodically polls for new data). The synchronisation server has
basically the tasks to locate the mobile device by determining
its unique ID or address, to establish a communication, and to
control the synchronisation process. Our first concept is only
concerned with the security of the data exchange, as there are
various established protocols standardising the synchronisation
process, e.g., OMA data synchronisation (OMA DS). In Step 2
of Figure 3 a secure channel between the synchronisation
server and the mobile device is established. This can be
performed employing known methods such as Transport Layer
Security (TLS). After this, an attestation of the platform is
required to testify the mobile device and to proof the integrity
of the platform (Step 3). Security of the following steps relies
on this assertion of platform trustworthiness. Step 4 performs a
key exchange so that the data can be encrypted independently
of channel security. This step is optional if the secure channel
is strong enough and considered reliable. After this, the data is
transferred to the mobile device (Step 5). The device receives
the data and stores them in sealed data blobs (standardised by
TCG [3, Chapter 12]). As the result of this, the data is only
accessible in the chosen state of this unique device.
This basic approach suffers from the drawback of a high la-
tency produced by the Steps 2-4. Especially remote attestation
creates a high computational load and produces some traffic.
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A solution to this problem is a public/private key scheme.
We now refine the base concept accordingly, presenting our
second concept exhibited in Figure 4. The synchronisation
server now encrypts the data with a public key. The usage
of the corresponding private key should be restricted by a
PCR value as it is known from the first scenario. To grant
trust in this public key the synchronisation server requires
a certificate issued by this particular TPM or a third party
stating that this public key corresponds to a private key both
created by a valid TPM on a TP. Also, the particular PCR value
must be enclosed in this certificate. This concept is very close
to attestation identity keys (AIKs) which are used in TC for
platform attestation. The AIK privacy CA which certifies these
platform keys can be used here to issue certificates augmented
by the information of the PCR value. This variant of an AIK
is further called a binding key. In contrast to an AIK its aim is
not to provide pseudonymity but a way to encrypt data at the
side of the sender which can only be used in a predefined
state on the receiver side (this feature could also be used
to establish a lightweight DRM mechanism). By requiring a
certain PCR value, the activity of a certain application on the
device can be enforced as it is necessary that this application
was reported to the TPM. In the example of an e-mail push
service the presence of an e-mail application is required in a
certain configuration and a well defined environment.
The top-level protocol for creation and usage of binding
keys is presented in Figure 4. The data source again offers
(by either push or pull) new data. The protocol is parted in
three stages. Stage 1 is concerned with the key creation and the
issuing of the certificate. In Stage 2 the key is registered at the
side of the synchronisation server. In the final stage the key is
used for its purpose. Step 1 (from Stage 1) transmits the public
portion of a key pair to the PCA. Additionally several other
certificates are transmitted. In Step 2 an online attestation is
performed which assures the status of the mobile device and
extracts the actual PCR values. Using this value a certificate is
created stating that the key originates from a trusted platform
and that it is useable if and only if the platform equals a
certain state. This certificate is transmitted in Step 3 to the
mobile device. Step 4 describes that the binding key and the
corresponding certificate are transmitted to the synchronisation
server. Herein it is necessary to register this data for use by a
certain user. This process depends on the particular use case
and is not in the scope of this paper. Steps 1 to 4 only have to
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be performed once during the roll out of the device or the take
ownership of it by the user. In Step 5 the data is transmitted
to the synchronisation server. The synchronization server can
now encrypt the data with the binding key or maybe with a
hybrid encryption scheme based on this key. A previous key
exchange is not required. As the key is bound to a certain state
it is also not required to check if the device is in this state as
neither the device nor any other entity can unveil the content
of the data. This takes place in Steps 5 and 6.
Let us briefly discuss efficiency matters, keeping in mind
that the analysis must remain hypothetical since we do not
have a real-world implementation. Comparing the two schemes
it becomes obvious that the first is much more flexible in its
application than the second one. The server can decide each
time if the particular device can be considered as trustworthy.
Binding the transmitted data to a defined system state leads
to a very restricted application scenario as the system state
is not necessarily static. The mobile version of the TPM,
the MTM, introduces some new concepts, which might be
of use with respect to this problem. The standard employs an
abstraction layer by the definition of so-called trusted engines.
The described functionality (of model 2) can now be located
in such an engine. This engine controls the complete handling,
including de/encryption and display of pushed content and
thus comprises a trustworthy system compartment for this sole
purpose. The rest of the system can run freely, adding much
flexibility to our core concepts.
With respect to performance, the use of TC in the described
way has its advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand,
the hardware capabilities of the TPM or MTM add consid-
erable power to existing systems for instance for the physical
generation of random numbers. By design the MTM/TPM
operates independently and in parallel to the system’s CPU.
On the other hand, key cryptographic tasks used in our
concept are expensive. In particular the generation of AIKs
is rather slow and may take, together with remote attestation,
some 15 seconds. Though this restriction is partly due to the
“historical” binding of the TPM to the low pin count (LPC)
bus of the PC, and may even not apply to the mobile version,
TCG implementers a dedicated pre-fetch mechanism for AIK
generation to accelerate a TPM’s response to AIK requests.
For our concept the main latency introduced by TC is by
remote attestation, which may take up to 8 seconds (always
at LPC bus cycles). If we assume that even a new AIK is
used for every push operation, as in a ticket system which we
described elsewhere [6], then the overall latency might add up
to 30 seconds. Push services typically have a relatively low
message frequencies for a single addressee, so that the concept
seems still feasible, even with current technology. Otherwise
it would still be possible to perform a bulk message transfer.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The presented solutions provide both a feasible way to
synchronise data and to transport them securely from one
entity to another. As shown in the second concept, one can
reduce the computational costs for the server and the device
as some of the steps from the first concept can be omitted by
a cunning use of the Trusted Computing concepts of privacy
CAs and AIKs. The presented methods represent a strong
base for a lightweight DRM system based on TC. Certain
data can only be decoded and used precisely if the device is
in the desired trustworthy state. It should be noted that our
application uses TC in a way different from DRM, which is
often considered as the sole use for TC. Both applications bind
the economic value to a particular instantiation of the TPM.
If this trust anchor breaks, only a limited damage can occur
as the damage is restricted in space and timeto a single data
synchronisation in a push service or submission of a single
reputation. In contrast, if a single TPM in a DRM system
breaks, the protected digital good can be converted into an
unprotected version which can be freely distributed on a large
scale, causing heavy monetary losses to its owner.
AIKs lend themselves to more applications than blob sealing
only. Since they are generated by the trusted platform itself and
are available in principle in unlimited number, they can be used
for various different purposes. This can go so far as to provide
a basis for a full-fledged identity management. In [6] we have
shown how to implement a pseudonymous ticket system based
on AIKs. The papers [7], [8] exhibit some further TC uses in
the mobile domain.
It is interesting to note that introducing TC yields a
secondary user bound identification token. Due to the take
ownership procedure of the TPM it is bound to a certain user.
Therefore it is in its function very similar to a SIM as it is
also possible to migrate the relevant parts from one TPM to the
next. One may ask whether two different identification tokens
will survive in future TC-enabled mobile devices.
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